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Mary T. Noonan 
Clerk of the Court 
Utah Court of Appeals 
400 Midtown Plaza 
230 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Re: State v. Galleaos, Case No. 890513-CA 
Dear Ms. Noonan: 
I wish to make the following correction to the State's brief in 
the above-referenced case, filed with the Court on October 30, 
1991. 
The brief inadvertently cites the 1990 version of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-23a-8(l) in support of the State's argument that the statute 
is in accord with its federal counterpart (Appellee's Brief at 13 
n.5). The State's argument on this point is based on the 1988 
version of the statute, effective at the time of relevant events in 
this case. Therefore, footnote 5 on page 13 of the State's brief, 
only to the extent that it quotes the 1990 version of the statute, 
should be amended to reflect a reference to the 1988 version of the 
statute, as follows: 
5
 Defendant has not cited to any specific section of the 
act; therefore, the State assumes for purposes of analysis 
that defendant's challenge is based on language contained in 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23a-8(l) (1988), which provides, in 
pertinent part, as follows: 
The attorney general of the state, or any 
assistant attorney general specially 
designated by the attorney general or any 
county attorney or deputy county attorney 
specially designated by the county attorney, 
may authorize an application to a judge of 
competent jurisdiction for, and the judge may 
STATE OF UTAH 
grant in conformity with the procedures for 
interception of wire . . . communications by 
any law enforcement agency of this state or 
any political subdivisions responsible for the 
investigation of the type of offense regarding 
which the application is made, an order 
authorizing of approving the interception of a 
wire . . . communication by any law 
enforcement agency of this state or any 
political subdision responsible for the 
investigation of the offense for which the 
application is made, when the interception 
sought may provide or has provided evidence of 
the commission of the offense of • . . dealing 
in narcotic drugs, marihuana, or other 
dangerous drugs . . ., and punishable by 
imprisonment for more than one year, or any 
conspiracy to commit any of these offenses. 
Thank you for your attention to this matter. 
Respectfully, 
Kenneth A. Bronston 
' Assitant Attorney General 
cc: Randall Gaither 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, I 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No, 890513-CA 
v* : 
ROSS GALLEGOS, : Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for two counts of 
agreeing, consenting, offering or arranging to distribute 
cocaine, second degree felonies, and eight counts of agreeing, 
consenting, offering or arranging to distribute marijuana, third 
degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
S 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (1990), in the Fourth Judicial District Court 
in and for Utah County, State of Utah, the Honorable Ray M. 
Harding, presiding. This Court has jurisdiction to hear this 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1991). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issues presented in this appeal are: 
1. Did defendant fail to preserve (1) his allegation 
of error regarding the standard of review applicable to district 
court orders authorizing wiretaps by failing to timely present 
his argument to the trial court, (2) his claim that the Utah 
Controlled Substances Act is unconstitutional and (3) his 
objection to the trial court's jury instructions? As a general 
rule, the grounds for an objection must be distinctly and 
specifically stated in the trial court before this Court will 
review those grounds on appeal. State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 
1144-45 (Utah 1989); State v. Carter. 707 P.2d 656, 661 (Utah 
1985). 
2. Did defendant fail to provide an adequate record 
for review by this Court? It is a well established rule of 
appellate procedure that the party asserting error has the "duty 
and responsibility of supporting such allegation by an adequate 
record." State v. Wulffenstein, 657 P.2d 289, 294 (Utah 1982), 
cert, denied, 460 U.S. 1044 (1983). Where the defendant fails to 
supplement the record with evidence critical to his allegations 
of error on appeal, the appellate court will presume the 
regularity of the proceedings below. State v. Robbins, 709 P.2d 
771, 773 (Utah 1985). 
3. Was the evidence presented at trial sufficient to 
support the jury's verdict? When challenging the jury's verdict, 
the defendant must show that the evidence and its inferences are 
so "inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds 
must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
committed the crime of which he was convicted. •• State v. Petree, 
659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983). "[S]o long as some evidence and 
reasonable inferences support the jury's findings, [the appellate 
court] will not disturb them. See State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 
2 
345 (Utah 1985) ." State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 738 (Utah App, 
1990). To meet this burden, defendant must marshal all the 
evidence in support of the verdict and then demonstrate that even 
viewing it in the light most favorable to the court below, the 
evidence is insufficient to support the verdict. Failure to so 
marshal the evidence waives an appellant's right to have his 
claim of insufficiency considered on appeal. JId. at 738-39. 
4. Did the trial court properly deny defendant's 
motion for a mistrial made on the ground that defendant was 
prejudiced by witness statements alluding to his prior criminal 
activities? A motion for mistrial is addressed the sound 
discretion of the trial court, and its ruling will not be upset 
unless it appears that it has abused its discretion. State v. 
Thompson, 751 P.2d 805, 818 (Utah App. 1988). "With regard to 
motions for mistrial . . . '[t]he critical inquiry should be 
whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the incident so 
prejudiced the jury that in its absence there might have been a 
different result." Ibid. "[The appellate court] will not 
reverse a conviction unless the error is substantial and 
prejudicial in the sense that there is a reasonable likelihood 
that in its absence there would have been a more favorable result 
for the defendant." State v. Johnson. 771 P.2d 1071, 1073 (Utah 
1989) (footnote omitted). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Determinative constitutional provisions, statutes and 
rules are compiled in Appendix A where not set forth in the body 
3 
of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Ross Gallegos, was charged by information 
with one count of conducting or participating in the conduct of 
an enterprise through a pattern of unlawful activity, a second 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-10-1603, and 
-1603.5 (1990) (count 1). He was also charged with three counts 
of agreeing, consenting, offering or arranging to distribute 
cocaine, second degree felonies (counts 10, 13 and 18), and 
sixteen counts of agreeing, consenting, offering or arranging to 
distribute marijuana, third degree felonies (counts 2-9, 11, 12, 
14-17 and 20), in violation of the Utah Controlled Substances 
Act, Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (1990) (Record, 
hereinafter "R." 27-31). 
Prior to a jury trial, defendant moved to dismiss 
count 1, the pattern of racketeering charge, and to suppress 
telephonic recordings obtained by wire interception (hereinafter 
"wiretaps") on the following grounds relevant to this appeal: 
(1) Utah's Interception of Communications Act, Utah Code Ann. SS 
77-23a-l to -16 (1990), violated federal law and was 
unconstitutional under both the United States and Utah 
Constitutions, (2) the wiretap order was invalid and illegal, and 
(3) the police agency conducting the wiretap did not adequately 
minimize the interception of telephone calls (R. 35-37, 115-16). 
Defendant's motion to suppress was heard on July 12, 1989, at 
which time the trial court took evidence, but did not rule, 
4 
continuing the matter until July 25, 1989 (R. 90-91). At that 
hearing, defendant and the State made their arguments on the 
motion to suppress, and the trial court again took the motions to 
suppress and to dismiss under advisement (Transcript of July 25, 
1989, hereinafter "Tl."). 
Immediately preceding the commencement of trial, the 
court denied the motion to suppress and dismissed count 9 
(Transcript of July 26, 1989, hereinafter "T2." 4-5). During 
trial, the court also dismissed count 10 (Transcript of July 27, 
1989, hereinafter "T3." 99). At the close of the State's case, 
defendant renewed his motion to dismiss count one and, further, 
to dismiss counts two through twenty, apparently on the grounds 
that there was no actual transfer of drugs and that defendant's 
wiretapped conversations evidenced no more than mere 
accommodation to provide controlled substances (T3. 99-111). 
Defendant also moved for a mistrial based on witness's references 
which inferred that defendant (1) had been in jail before and (2) 
had been previously "busted" (T3. 99). The trial court later 
denied these motions (T3. 194). 
Defendant was convicted of two counts of agreeing, 
consenting, offering or arranging to distribute cocaine (counts 
13 and 18), and eight counts of agreeing, consenting, offering or 
arranging to distribute marijuana (counts 3, 7, 8, 11, 12, 14, 15 
and 19) (R. 250, 307-24). Thereafter, defendant filed motions to 
arrest judgment and for a new trial (R. 349-50, 354-55). The 
motions were denied and defendant was sentenced to one to fifteen 
5 
years on counts 13 and 18 and to not less that five years on all 
remaining counts (R. 359-60)• Defendant was granted a 
certificate of probable cause and was ordered released and 
transported to the Alcohol Recovery Center upon posting of 
$ 10,000-00 bail (R. 363, 372), 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
A recitation of the facts here involved is not 
necessary to a resolution of the issues raised on appeal. 
Rather, critical facts will be discussed in the body of this 
brief as they become relevant to specific issues. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The majority of the issues that defendant raises on 
appeal are properly dismissed on procedural grounds of either 
waiver and/or lack of record support. It is well established 
that the grounds for an objection to evidence must be distinctly 
and specifically stated in the trial court before an appellate 
court will review those grounds on appeal. Because defendant 
failed to timely present (1) his allegation of error regarding 
the standard of review applicable to district court orders 
authorizing the wiretaps, (2) his claim that the Utah Controlled 
Substances Act is unconstitutional and (3) his objection to the 
trial court's jury instructions, he has waived consideration of 
these issues by this Court.1 
1
 In anticipation of defendant's moving this Court for leave 
to augment the record and permit him to file a supplemental 
brief, the State has filed, contemporaneously with this 
responsive brief, a motion for leave to file a supplemental brief 
when the record has been fully augmented. 
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Notwithstanding this Court's possible decision to 
review issues defendant failed to preserve for appeal, 
defendant's claims as to (1) the unconstitutionality of the Utah 
Controlled Substances Act and (2) the trial court's erroneous 
rulings as to jury instructions are unmeritorious. First, Utah's 
current Controlled Substances Act is not unconstitutional. 
Although the Utah Supreme Court has previously upheld the act as 
constitutional, defendant asserts that the current act is 
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad because the "for value" 
element of the offense has since been deleted by legislative 
amendment. However, the current act, like its predecessor, 
clearly specifies that it is unlawful for any person to knowingly 
and intentionally engage in conduct which either leads to, or 
results in the distribution of controlled substances. Thus, the 
average citizen is put on notice that any act in furtherance of 
the distribution of a controlled substance, or arrangement 
therefore, constitutes the criminal offense described by the 
statute. As to defendant's allegations of "overbreadth," he has 
wholly failed to demonstrate that the act prohibits 
constitutionally protected conduct. Second, the trial court's 
jury instruction setting out the elements necessary to prove 
defendant guilty under the "arranging" portion of the statute 
were expressed in the statutory language almost verbatim and were 
clear. 
Defendant's failure to adequately supplement the record 
in this case similarly precludes review by this Court of his 
7 
assertions of error concerning the district court's order 
authorizing the wiretap. Specifically, defendant has not 
included in the record on appeal the application for an ex parte 
wiretap order, the supporting affidavits, the ex parte order or 
the weekly reports actually stating the manner in which the 
wiretap was carried out; therefore, this Court may properly 
assume the regularity of the district court's order and decline 
review of all defendant's allegations related thereto. 
Contrary to defendant's claim, the Interception of 
Communications Act does not conflict with its federal 
counterpart. The federal act expressly authorizes the principal 
prosecuting attorney of any political subdivision of the state to 
apply for a wiretap order, if state law so provides. In 
accordance with that directive, the Utah wiretap act, read in 
conjunction with the Utah Constitution, clearly identifies a 
county attorney as a prosecutor authorized to apply for a wiretap 
order. 
As to defendant's allegations of insufficient evidence, 
he has neither marshaled all the evidence in support of the 
jury's verdict nor demonstrated that the evidence, including all 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is insufficient to support 
the jury's verdict with respect to all but four of the counts on 
which he was convicted; thus, at to those counts untreated in 
defendant's brief, this Court need not and should not consider 
his allegations. As to those counts for which evidence is 
arguably marshalled, the evidence was clearly sufficient to 
8 
support the jury's verdict of guilt under the arranging statute. 
Finally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in denying defendant's motion for mistrial made on the ground 
that defendant was prejudiced by two statements made by witnesses 
alluding to his prior criminal activities. The first statement 
had negligible prejudicial value, evidenced by the jury's ability 
to distinguish between defendant's guilt on some counts and his 
innocence on others. Any prejudice associated with the second 
statement was cured by the trial court's immediately striking it 
from the record and instructing the jury to disregard it. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT FAILED TO PRESERVE THE ISSUE RAISED 
IN POINT I OF HIS BRIEF FOR REVIEW BY THIS 
COURT AND HAS FAILED TO COMPILE AN ADEQUATE 
RECORD FOR REVIEW. 
In Point I of his brief defendant argues that a strict 
standard should be applied "to all issues involving all orders 
authorizing interception of communications on the trial or 
appellate level;" therefore, this Court should adopt a "strict 
standard" in reviewing the trial court's denial of his motion to 
suppress. Specifically, defendant argues that this Court should 
apply a "standard of strict compliance with all aspects of" [the 
Interception of Communications Act]"2 (Appellant's Brief at 12). 
Defendant thereafter continues to assert the trial court's 
failure to apply the appropriate standard, identifying a number 
2
 See Utah Code Ann. S 77-23a-2 (1990). 
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of deficiencies in the application and affidavit supporting the 
order (Appellant's Brief at 14-15). 
In order to assess whether or not the trial court 
deviated from the standards suggested by defendant, assuming such 
standards are applicable to this case, the record on appeal must 
at least contain the order, and the application and affidavit in 
support. Further, weekly reports, describing the manner in which 
the wiretap was actually carried out, were supplied to the trial 
court (Tl. 57-58). In this case defendant has not included in 
the record on appeal any of those crucial documents.3 
Rule 11(e)(2), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
provides: 
If the appellant intends to urge on 
appeal that a finding or conclusion is 
unsupported by or is contrary to the 
evidence, the appellant shall include in the 
record a transcript of all evidence relevant 
to such finding or conclusion. 
(emphasis added)• 
It is a well established rule of appellate procedure 
that where, as in the present case, a defendant asserts error, he 
has the "duty and responsibility of supporting such allegation by 
an adequate record." State v. Wulffenstein, 657 P.2d 289, 293 
3
 Defendant has appended to his brief uncertified copies of 
the application for the ex parte wiretap order and the order. 
Inclusion of uncertified copies of documents necessary to the 
determination of an issue is insufficient to create a record that 
can be considered on appeal. State v. Lairbv, 699 P.2d 1187, 
1192 (Utah 1984). 
10 
(Utah 1982)f cert, denied, 460 U.S. 1044 (1983). Without record 
support, defendant's assertions of error in the district court's 
order "stands as a unilateral allegation" which this Court has no 
power to determine, id.; State v. Robbins, 709 P.2d 771, 773 
(Utah 1985); Intermountain Power Agency v. Bowers-Irons 
Recreation Land & Cattle Co., 786 P.2d 250# 252 (Utah App. 1990) 
(Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure direct counsel to provide the 
reviewing court with all evidence relevant to the issues raised 
on appeal). Where, as here, defendant has failed to supplement 
the record with evidence critical to a determination of his 
allegations on appeal, this Court must presume the regularity of 
the trial court's order. Ibid.: Jolivet v. Cook, 784 P.2d 1148, 
1150 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 110 S.Ct. 751 (1990) (the 
appellate court assumes regularity in the proceedings below if 
appellant fails to provide an adequate record on appeal); State 
v. Marcum, 750 P.2d 599, 603 (Utah 1988) (absent evidence of 
error, the regularity of the proceeding below should be assumed); 
State v. Theison, 709 P.2d 307, 309 (Utah 1985) (where crucial 
matters were not included in the record, court may presume the 
missing portions support the action of the trial court). 
Additionally, defendant failed to properly preserve 
this issue for appeal. Rule 12, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, provides: 
(b) Any defense, objection or request, 
including requests for ruling on the 
admissibility of evidence, which is capable 
of determination without the trial of the 
general issue may be raised prior to trial by 
written motion. The following shall be 
11 
raised at least five day prior to the trial: 
. • • • 
(2) motions concerning the admissibility of 
evidence. 
(emphasis added). Rule 12(d) further provides that failure to 
raise objections or defenses "shall constitute a waiver thereof, 
but the court for cause shown may grant relief from such waiver." 
Utah R. Crim. P. 12(d). See also State v. Belcrard, 160 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 42, 44-45 (Utah App. 1991). 
Defendant moved to suppress evidence obtained pursuant 
to a wiretap of all his incoming and outgoing telephone calls on 
the grounds that (1) Utah's Interception of Communications Act, 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-23a-l to -16 (1990), violated federal law 
and was unconstitutional under both the United States and Utah 
constitutions, (2) the wiretap order was invalid and illegal, and 
(3) the police agency conducting the wiretap did not adequately 
minimize interception of telephone calls (R. 35-37). There is no 
argument concerning a requirement to apply a strict standard in 
that motion. The hearing on defendant's motion was held on July 
12, 1989 (R. 90-91). There is no transcript of that hearing in 
the record. The July 12th hearing was continued until July 25, 
1989, the day immediately preceding trial (R. 91). The record 
contains an unsigned memorandum in support of defendant's motion 
to suppress, filed July 20, 1989 (R. 175-183). It is only in 
that memorandum that defendant makes his first reference to a 
"strict standard" (R. 175). Thus, in first referencing the 
application of a strict standard less than five working days 
12 
before trial, defendant was untimely in bringing such argument 
before the trial court and failed to preserve the claim on 
appeal. Utah R. Crim. P. 12(b)(1), (d); see also State v. 
Fulton, 742 P.2d 1208, 1212 (Utah 1987) (defendant precluded from 
introducing allegedly exculpatory polygraph for failure to timely 
raise question of admissibility prior to trial). 
POINT II 
FOR THE PURPOSES OF THIS CASE SECTION 77-23a-
8(1) OF THE INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS 
ACT IS IN ACCORD WITH ITS FEDERAL 
COUNTERPART, 18 U.S.C. S 2516(2), IN 
AUTHORIZING THE COUNTY ATTORNEY TO MAKE 
APPLICATION FOR A WIRETAP. 
In Point II, defendant alleges that Utah's Interception 
of Communications Act violates its federal counterpart4 by 
failing to limit applications for authorization for wiretaps 
solely to the Utah Attorney General5 (Appellant's brief at 15-
* Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets 
Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 2510-2510 (Supp. 1991), "provides the 
framework for the Utah Interception of Communications Act," Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 77-23a-l to 77-23a-16 (1990). "The Utah Act, as 
well as its federal counterpart, set forth the procedure for 
authorizing and approving the interception of wire 
communications." State v. Hunt, 781 P.2d 473, 475 (Utah App. 
1989). Although States may enact legislation "more restrictive 
than the baseline protections" allowed by the federal act, "'any 
State law drawn more broadly . . . . runs afoul of the supremacy 
clause (U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2).'M People v. Vespucci, 554 
N.Y.S.2d 417, 75 N.Y.2d 434, 553 N.E.2d 965, 967 (N.Y. 1990) 
(citations omitted). 
5
 Defendant has not cited to any specific section of the 
act; therefore, the State assumes for purposes of analysis that 
defendant's challenge is based on language contained in Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-23a-8(l) (1990) which provides as follows: 
The attorney general of the state or any 
assistant attorney general, or any county 
attorney or deputy county attorney may 
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20). Specifically, defendant asserts that •the [ajttorney 
[g]eneral as a member of the [e]xecutive [ddepartment is the 
principal prosecuting attorney of the state and should be the 
only official capable of authorizing and applying for a wiretap . 
. . •" (Appellant's Brief at 17). 
Defendant's analysis of the issue conflicts with the plain 
language of the both the federal and state statutes. The federal 
statute clearly authorizes not only "[t]he principal prosecuting 
attorney" of the state, but also "the principal prosecuting 
attorney of any political subdivision" in the state to make 
application for an order authorizing a wiretap, so long as there 
authorize an application to a judge of 
competent jurisdiction for an order for an 
interception of wire, electronic, or oral 
communications by any law enforcement agency 
of the state or of any political subdivision 
that is responsible for investigating the 
type of offense for which the application is 
made. 
The federal Wire and Oral Interception Act provides, in 
pertinent part: 
The principal prosecuting attorney of 
any State, or the principal prosecuting 
attorney of any political subdivision 
thereof, if such attorney is authorized by a 
statute of that State to make application to 
a State court judge of competent jurisdiction 
for an order authorizing or approving the 
interception of wire, oral, or electronic 
communications, may apply to such judge for, 
and such judge may grant in conformity with 
section 2518 of this chapter and with the 
applicable State statute, an order 
authorizing, or approving the interception of 
wire, oral, or electronic communications . . 
18 U.S.C. § 2516(2) (Supp. 1991). 
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is also a state statue authorizing the same. See U.S.C. S 
2516(2) • The state statute similarly authorizes the attorney 
general of the state, or any county attorney, to authorize an 
application for a wiretap order. See section 77-23a-8(l). 
Because neither the federal nor Utah statutes limit authorization 
solely to the "principal prosecuting attorney" of the state, 
defendant's argument is without merit. Vespucci, 553 N.E.2d at 
967-968 (noting that Congress wrote a generic enabling statute to 
cover the 50 widely varying official titles and chains of command 
in all the state jurisdictions). 
POINT III 
DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO PROPERLY SUPPORT HIS 
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR ON APPEAL WITH CITES TO 
AN EXISTING RECORD HAMPERS THE STATE'S 
RESPONSE AND PRECLUDES MEANINGFUL REVIEW BY 
THIS COURT. 
In Points III and V of his brief on appeal, defendant 
attacks the validity of the court order authorizing the wiretap 
of his phone on the grounds that the order (1) failed to set 
forth adequate guidelines for purposes of minimization6 and (2) 
failed to properly limit the persons authorized to intercept 
6
 Utah Code Ann. S 77-23a-10(5)(c) (1990) provides: 
Every order and extension shall contain a 
provision that the authorization to intercept 
shall be executed as soon as practicable, 
shall be conducted so as to minimize the 
interception of communications not otherwise 
subject to interception under this chapter, 
and must terminate upon attainment of the 
authorized objective, or in any event within 
30 days. 
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communications7 (Appellant's Brief at 20-21, 23-24). In Point 
IV, defendant asserts that the officers conducting the wiretap 
failed to adequately limit the communications intercepted in 
accordance with the court order (Appellant's Brief at 21-23). 
Although defendant quotes portions of the court order, a copy of 
the order has not been included in the record on appeal. 
Further, defendant has failed to include the affidavit supporting 
the application for the ex parte wiretap order or the weekly 
records describing how the order was actually carried out. 
Moreover, a review of the record as it is presently constituted 
is devoid of any indication that defendant has moved to 
supplement the record with copies of those crucial documents 
(Defendant's Request for Transcript, R. 370). 
Since defendant has failed to support his argument with 
an adequate record, demonstrating the contents of the order, the 
basis on which the order was issued, and the manner in which the 
order was actually carried out, his argument is without merit and 
cannot be meaningfully reviewed by this Court. State v. 
Wulffenstein, 657 P.2d 289, 293 (Utah 1982), cert, denied, 460 
U.S. 1044 (1983) (noting that where a defendant asserts error, he 
has the duty and responsibility of supporting his assertion by an 
7
 Defendant argues that the wiretap order is overbroad and 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 77-23a-2(5) and 77-23a-3(d) 
(Appellant's Brief at 23). These sections are non-existent. 
Therefore, this Court may refuse to consider this component of 
defendant's argument because it is effectively unsupported by 
legal authority. State v. Amicone, 589 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 
1984). In fact, Utah Code Ann. § 77-23a-10(3)(d) (1990) provides 
that the order authorizing the wiretap shall identify the agency 
authorized to conduct the wiretap. 
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adequate record). Where, as here, defendant has failed to 
supplement the record with evidence critical to a determination 
of his allegations on appeal, this Court must presume the 
regularity of the application. Jolivet v. Cook, 784 P.2d 1148, 
1150 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 110 S.Ct. 751 (1990) (the 
appellate court assumes regularity in the proceedings below if 
appellant fails to provide an adequate record on appeal); State 
v. Marcum, 750 P.2d 599, 603 (Utah 1988) (absent evidence of 
error, the regularity of the proceeding below should be assumed); 
State v. Theison, 709 P.2d 307, 309 (Utah 1985) (where crucial 
matters were not included in the record, the appellate court may 
presume the missing portions support the action of the trial 
court). 
POINT IV 
DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE 
IN SUPPORT OF HIS CLAIM OF INSUFFICIENT 
EVIDENCE PRECLUDES CONSIDERATION OF THE ISSUE 
BY THIS COURT; ALTERNATIVELY, WHERE DEFENDANT 
HAS ARGUABLY MARSHALED THE EVIDENCE, HE HAS 
NOT DEMONSTRATED THAT THE EVIDENCE, INCLUDING 
ALL REASONABLE INFERENCES DRAWN THEREFROM, IS 
INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE JURY'S VERDICT. 
In Point VI of his brief, defendant alleges that the 
evidence was insufficient to convict him of the offenses charged 
and appears to attack the lack of additional evidence, broadly 
asserting that the State "never proved all of the elements of the 
offense[s]M (Appellant's Brief at 26). In Point VIII of his 
brief, defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to 
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support his convictions on counts 13 and 18.8 However, 
defendant asserts this claim with minimal specificity and only as 
to counts 3 and 19 (Point VI) and 13 and 18 (Point VIII) 
(Appellant's Brief at 26-28 and 33-34). 
In order to successfully challenge the jury's verdict 
the reviewing court must find that the evidence and its 
inferences are so "inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that 
the defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted." 
State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983). In undertaking 
such review, the appellate court will "view the evidence, along 
with the reasonable inferences from it, in the light most 
favorable to the verdict." State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 738 
(Utah App. 1990) (citation omitted). M[S]o long as some evidence 
and reasonable inferences support the jury's findings, we will 
not disturb them. See State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 
1985)." Ibid. 
To meet this burden, defendant must marshal all the 
evidence in support of the verdict and then demonstrate that even 
viewing it in the light most favorable to the court below, the 
evidence is insufficient to support the vcsrdict. Failure to so 
marshal the evidence waives an appellant's right to have his 
claim of insufficiency considered on appeal. Moore, 802 P.2d at 
8
 Defendant couches this argument in terms of the evidence 
establishing only accommodation and non-distribution of 
controlled substances (Appellant's Brief at 32). Essentially, 
this too is an insufficiency of evidence argument. 
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738-39. Because defendant has failed to marshal the evidence in 
support of the jury's verdict of guilt on counts other than 3/ 
13, 18 and 19 on which he was convicted (e.g., counts 7, 8, 11, 
12, 14 and 15), this Court need not and should not consider 
defendant's allegations of insufficiency in Point VI. 
Notwithstanding the above, in Points VI and VIII of his 
brief defendant specifically attacks the sufficiency of the 
evidence in support of counts 3, 13, 18 and 19, and arguably 
attempts to marshal all the evidence the jury relied upon in 
finding defendant guilty of those charges. However, in making 
his argument defendant appears to lose sight of the clear 
elements required to establish criminal culpability. Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (1990) makes it unlawful to knowingly 
and intentionally to "agree, consent, offer, or arrange to 
distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance." 
The State introduced call #143 as its primary evidence 
of defendant's guilt on count 3 (T2. 176).9 Defendant was 
9
 The numbered transcriptions of intercepted communications 
comprise the State's exhibit #1 (R. 254). None of these 
transcriptions were expressly correlated with the particular 
counts with which defendant was charged in the course of trial, 
except during the State's closing, and then only with respect to 
some of the charges. Therefore, in order to demonstrate which 
wiretapped calls were offered as support for a particular charge 
certain identifying features of the call, as evidenced by the 
relevant wiretap transcript, must be correlated with either the 
party's reference in closing argument and/or the charge as set 
forth in the information. With respect to count 3, the State 
stated that the charge was supported by the evidence of call 
#143, and defendant referenced the phrase, "check it out," which 
appears in the transcript of call #143 (T3. 126, 156-57). 
Further, count 3 concerns a criminal act occurring on March 24, 
1989, to which a Mike Ovard was a party (R. 27-28; Transcript of 
call #143, Appendix B). No other transcriptions made on March 24 
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identified as a party to that conversation by a police officer 
who had become familiar with those voices that were regularly 
heard over the wiretapped telephone (T2. 177). In the course of 
that conversation defendant indicated that he had been unable to 
obtain "smoke" for the caller and agreed to check around for "an 
elbow." Expert testimony had earlier identified "smoke" as 
marijuana and "elbow" as a half-pound of marijuana (T2. 67-68, 
136, 138).10 
Calls #621 and #639 were introduced to prove the 
charges in count 13 (T3. 28, 55).u Dan LeMaster testified for 
the State as to the conversation set out in call #621 (T3. 29-
52). In that call LeMaster stated to defendant that he had 
unsuccessfully sought to obtain some "white" from "the Villa[i]n" 
and then told defendant that he needed "a little half." The 
conversation then continued as follows: 
LeMaster: Urn, well I was just gonna cruise 
over and pick it up if I could find 
Villa[i]n, if I could find him just 
cruise over pick 'em up. 
Defendant: Yeah, if you could find Villa[i]n 
and offered in evidence include conversations with a Mike Ovard. 
10
 Mark West, Provo City pclice officer, testified that 
cocaine could also be smoked (T2. 83); however, Chris Orndorff, 
testified that he had never heard of "smoke" used with reference 
to any other controlled substance than marijuana (T2. 93). 
11
 Both the State and defendant indicated in closing arguments 
that the witness, Dan LeMaster, made a reference to "the villain" 
in the relevant transcription used as evidence to support count 13 
(T3. 131, 160). That reference appears only in call #621 (Appendix 
B). Call #639, based on its date and time and the parties to the 
conversation, is clearly a followup to call #621 (Appendix B). 
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you wouldn't even need me, 
LeMaster: Yeah, right. But ya know. 
Defendant: Huh. 
LeMaster: Do you know where somethin, ya 
know somethin's happen. 
Defendant: I know where somethin's happen 
but. 
LeMaster: I could just meet ya someplace in 
a half hour or somethin. 
Defendant: I know but I was supposed to go 
to lunch right now. 
LeMaster: Oh, really? 
Defendant: Uh-huh ( + )12 
LeMaster: After lunch? 
Defendant: Yeah. 
(Transcript of call #621 at 4). The terms "white" and "a little 
half" had earlier been identified by LeMaster as drug jargon 
referring to (1) cocaine and (2) a half a gram of cocaine or 
marijuana, respectively (T2. 134-35).13 
Count 18 was supported by the evidence of call 
12
 The significance of this symbol is nowhere explained in 
the record, including the monitoring instructions, State's 
exhibit 10 to the July 12, 1989 hearing (R. 92). 
13
 Call #639 indicates that LeMaster unsuccessfully 
attempted to meet defendant and that defendant told LeMaster that 
he would probably not be able to get "it" because "they" were now 
watching him next door to his shop (Transcript of call #639 at 1-
2). 
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#1339 • Both LeMaster and Provo City police officer Tom 
Nielson, who monitored and transcribed the call, testified that 
LeMaster and defendant were the parties to that conversation (T3. 
73-75)• In that conversation defendant offered to provide 
LeMaster with a "gamer" (Transcript of call #1339 at 3, Appendix 
B). LeMaster earlier testified that "gamer" referred to an 
eighth of an ounce of cocaine (T2. 136). 
Lastly, count 19 was supported by call #1502.15 
Sergio Gonzales testified that he and defendant were the parties 
to that call, in which defendant offered, at Gonzales' request, 
to supply Gonzales with a "green paper," and thereafter directed 
Gonzales to his address (T3. 81-82; Transcript of call #1502, 
Appendix B). Gonzales identified "green paper" as "pot" (T3. 
81). Officer Orndorff had earlier testified that "pot" referred 
to mari juana (T2. 96). 
The State concedes that in none of these instances did 
defendant transfer controlled substances to any of the potential 
buyers. However, under section 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) of the Utah 
Controlled Substances Act actual transfer for value is not an 
element of the crime. State v. Pelton, 801 P.2d 184, 186 (Utah 
App. 1990) (post-amendment arranging statute, in which the "for 
14
 Both the State and defendant spoke, in closing, to count 
18 in terms of the conversation having LeMaster as a party and in 
which reference is made to a "gamer," a term used in call #1339 
(T3. 137, 163). 
15
 Both the State and defendant spoke to count 19 with 
reference to defendant's conversation with a Sergio Gonzales, 
whose name appears only in call #1502 (T3. 137-38, 163). 
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value" element had been deleted from the predecessor statute, was 
not unconstitutionally vague): State v. Clark, 783 P.2d 68, 69 
(Utah App. 1989) (culpability under the arranging statute does 
not require the actual consummation of a sale of controlled 
substances); State v. Harrison, 601 P.2d 922, 923 n.5 (Utah 1979) 
(M[t]he offense of arranging the distribution for value of a 
controlled substance does not require the actual distribution. •') 
Therefore, the facts set forth above with respect to each of the 
counts discussed amply demonstrate that the jury had sufficient 
evidence on which to convict defendant. 
POINT V 
DEFENDANT FAILED TO PRESERVE FOR REVIEW THE 
ISSUE RAISED IN POINT VII OF HIS BRIEF; IN 
ANY EVENT, UTAH'S CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT 
IS CONSTITUTIONAL. 
In Point VII of his brief defendant asserts that the 
offense of distribution of or arranging to distribute a 
controlled substance as prohibited in the Utah Controlled 
Substances Act16 is "unconstitutionally vague and over-broad 
because it does not clearly define the conduct prohibited when 
the element of a sale for value is absentM (Appellant's Brief at 
31). 
16
 Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (1990) provides in 
pertinent part: 
Except as authorized by this chapter, it is 
unlawful for any person to knowingly and 
intentionally: . . • (ii) distribute a 
controlled or counterfeit substance, or to 
agree, consent, offer, or arrange to 
distribute a controlled or counterfeit 
substance . • • 
23 
In State in Interest of M.S.. 781 P.2d 1289 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989), the Court stated: 
It is a fundamental principle of appellate 
review that matters not raised at the trial 
level cannot be raised for the first time on 
appeal• . • • 
Moreover, this principle applies equally to 
constitutional challenges not presented 
below, but raised subsequently on appeal. 
Id. at 1291 (Court declines to review where juvenile court judge 
not given opportunity to rule on issues of constitutionality); 
see also State v. Carter. 707 P.2d 656, 660-61 (Utah 1985) 
(failure to raise particular ground for suppressing evidence 
precludes consideration of appeal on that ground). 
Nowhere in any pre-trial motions to suppress or to 
dismiss# or in any trial, or post-trial motions to arrest 
judgment or for a new trial, does defendemt raise the issue of 
the unconstitutionality of the arranging statute. Since 
defendant failed to timely and specifically preserve this issue 
below, this Court should now decline to review it on appeal. 
State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1144-45 (Utah 1989) (noting 
general rule that the grounds for the objection must be 
distinctly and specifically stated in the trial court before an 
appellate court will review those grounds on appeal). 
In any event, section 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) is clearly 
constitutional.17 In State v. Harrison, 601 P.2d 922 (Utah 
17
 Defendant's brief fails to distinguish between 
"vagueness" and "overbreadth" and, in fact, only argues the 
former. Therefore, the State will limit its response to the 
question of vagueness. 
• • . cont. on next page . . • 
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1979), the Utah Supreme Court examined the predecessor statute18 
under a similar challenge and found it to be constitutional. In 
so finding, the Harrison court observed that, 
[b]readth of coverage, in and of itself, does 
not render a statute unconstitutionally 
vague. A statute may legitimately proscribe 
a broad spectrum of conduct with very few 
words, so long as the outer perimeters of 
such conduct are clearly defined. 
Id. at 923. The predecessor act accomplished this by clearly 
specifying that "any activity leading to or resulting in the 
distribution for value of a controlled substance" must be engaged 
in knowingly or intentionally. Ibid. Thus, because "any witting 
or intentional lending of aid in the distribution of drugs, 
Concerning overbreadth, defendant correctly asserts 
that the arranging statute makes it a felony to "share an amount 
of marijuana." However, he has not and cannot show that "sharing 
marijuana" is a constitutionally protected right. To be 
overbroad, a statute must reach a "substantial amount of 
constitutionally protected conduct[;] [i]f it does not, then the 
overbreadth challenge must fail." State v. Murphy, 674 P.2d 
1220, 1222 (Utah 1983) (quoting Village of Hoffman Estates v. 
Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494 (1982)). 
Where, as here, defendant has not shown and cannot show that the 
statute reaches a "substantial amount of constitutionally 
protected conduct," his allegation of "overbreadth" is simply 
without merit. Hoffman, 733 P.2d at 505 (noting that an 
"overbreadth" analysis relates to whether the statute is so broad 
that it may prohibit constitutionally protected behavior). 
18
 See Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) (1979) which read 
in pertinent part: 
Except as authorized by this act, it shall be 
unlawful for any person knowingly and 
intentionally: . . . (4) to agree, consent, 
offer, or arrange to distribute or dispense a 
controlled substance for value or to 
negotiate to have a controlled substance 
distributed or dispensed for value . . . . 
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whatever form it takes, is proscribed by the act[,] [t]he citizen 
of average intelligence is left with no confusion as to what type 
of conduct is forbidden." Id., at 923-24. 
The same is true of the current act which also clearly 
specifies that it is unlawful for any person to knowingly and 
intentionally engage in conduct which either leads to, or results 
in the distribution of controlled substances. See § 58-37-
8(1)(a)(ii). The current act, like its predecessor, puts the 
citizen on notice "that, if he intends the distribution [] of a 
controlled substance, any act in furtherance of an arrangement 
therefore constitutes the criminal offense described by the 
statute." Harrison, 601 P.2d at 924. See State v. Pelton, 801 
P.2d 184, 186 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (noting that Harrison 
clarifies the scope of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (Supp. 
1989), thereby finding the post-amendment statute 
constitutional). 
POINT VI 
DEFENDANT FAILED TO TIMELY AND SPECIFICALLY 
OBJECT TO JURY INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN BY THE 
TRIAL COURT, WHICH WERE PROPER. 
This court should refuse to address the merits of 
defendant's challenge to the jury instructions because he failed 
to timely and specifically object. Rule 19(c), Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, provides, in pertinent part: 
No party may assign as error any portion of 
the charge or omission therefrom unless he 
objects thereto before the jury is 
instructed, stating distinctly the matter to 
which he objects and the grounds of his 
objection. Notwithstanding a party's failure 
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to object, error may be assigned to 
instructions in order to avoid manifest 
injustice. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that "rule 19(c) 
requires more than a general exception to the instructions. It 
requires that the matter excepted to and the ground therefore be 
distinctly stated." State v. Cantu, 750 P.2d 591, 594 (Utah 
1988); see also State v. Parkin, 742 P.2d 715, 716 (Utah App. 
1987) (failure to object to an instruction at trial precludes 
defendant from challenging it on appeal, and failure to request 
an instruction is waiver). 
In the present case, the trial court held a bench 
conference to allow defendant to place his objections and 
exceptions in the record (T3. 176-79). In the course of that 
conference the trial court indicated that defendant, the State 
and the court had earlier been involved in several lengthy 
sessions regarding the appropriate instructions to be given to 
the jury and that both counsel had "had ample opportunity to 
present [their] positions", a statement which defendant 
acknowledged as, "correct" (T3. 176-77). Thereafter, defendant 
excepted to the court's refusal to give several of his requested 
instructions, and concluded by stating, "And those are the 
balancef] of the objections which I have to the instructions" 
(T3. 182-84). At no time did defendant except to the trial 
court's refusal to give those instructions which he urges on 
appeal, nor did he object to the trial court's instructions on 
the elements required to be proven on each count. Since 
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defendant failed to timely and specifically object to the trial 
court's refusal of the jury instructions urged on appeal, and 
further, to except to the trial court's instruction on the 
elements of the arranging statute, defendant has waived his claim 
of error. 
Even if defendant had not waived his claim of error it 
would be without sufficient merit to warrant reversal because the 
trial court's instructions on the elements of the crime were 
almost verbatim the language of section 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (R. 
270).19 "[I]t is not error to instruct according to statutory 
terms when the evidence justifies the instruction." State v. 
Ricci, 655 P.2d 690, 691-92 (Utah 1982); State v. Starks, 627 
P.2d 88, 90 (Utah 1990) (instruction in form of statutory 
language not improper where supported by the evidence and the 
meaning of the instruction is clear). 
POINT VII 
INADVERTENT REFERENCES TO DEFENDANT'S PRIOR 
CRIMINAL CONDUCT WERE NOT PREJUDICIAL AND 
WERE CURED BY THE TRIAL COURT'S STRIKING ONE 
OF THE REFERENCES AND ORDERING THE JURY TO 
DISREGARD IT. 
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in denying 
his motion for a mistrial based upon irrelevant, unfairly 
prejudicial testimony concerning defendant's prior arrests.20 A 
19
 The trial court's jury instruction is included at 
Appendix C. 
20
. Because defendant does not supply any legal analysis, 
this Court may refuse to consider this issue. Amicone 689 P.2d 
at 1344 (Utah 1984). 
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motion for a mistrial is addressed to the sound discretion of the 
trial court* State v. Thompson, 751 P.2d 805, 818 (Utah App. 
1988). The evidence demonstrates that the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in denying the motion. 
Defendant first moved for a mistrial following the 
testimony of Officer Ken Parker when, in providing the foundation 
for identifying defendant's voice during the wiretap, the witness 
stated, "I spoke with Ross as I worked as a jailer at Provo 
City." (T2. 119-20). Oat of the jury's presence, the trial court 
took the motion under advisement and granted defendant's motion 
to preclude Officer Parker from further testifying (T2. 125). 
Defendant again objected when LeMaster, explaining why 
defendant had relinquished some control over his drug business, 
stated, "Sure. Ross had been busted a little while before that" 
(T3. 33-34). Defendant later renewed his motion for a mistrial 
on the basis of this remark, which the trial court ultimately 
denied (T3. 99, 194). 
It is apparent that the trial court gave no curative 
instructions with respect to the first statement because of its 
minuscule prejudicial value, nor was any requested by defendant. 
The statement was inadvertently made and did not by itself 
clearly implicate defendant in other criminal action. Also, 
there was no further reference to the event to which the witness 
had alluded. Indeed, the jury may well have considered that the 
prosecution had been chastised by defendant's immediate request 
for a bench conference, followed by the trial court's summary 
29 
termination of Officer's Parker's testimony. See State v. 
Humphrey, 793 P.2d 918, 925 (Utah App. 1990) (trial court has 
discretion in determining if curative instruction is warranted in 
a particular case). In any event, it is clear that the jury was 
not prejudiced, as evidenced by its verdict to acquit defendant 
on eight of the counts with which he was charged. See State v. 
Johnson» 771 P.2d 1071, 1073 (Utah 1989) (no error affecting 
defendant's substantial rights, pursuant to rule 30(a), Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, where no showing that jury was 
influenced by trial court's allusion to an additional charge); 
State v. Rocco. 795 P.2d 1116, 1118 (Utah 1990) (no rule 30(a) 
error where testimonial reference to defendant's knowledge of 
other crimes did not necessarily implicate defendant in the 
commission of those crimes). 
Following defendant's objection to LeMaster's 
statement, the trial court immediately sustained the objection, 
ordered the statement struck from the record and instructed the 
jury to disregard the statement (T3. 34-35). It is apparent from 
the jury's acquittal of defendant on eight counts that the trial 
court's ruling cured any possible prejudice resulting from the 
jury's hearing LeMaster's statement. See State v. Van Dvke, 589 
P.2d 764, 766-67 (Utah 1978) (defendant is not denied a fair 
trial where, following codefendant's allusion to defendant's 
participation in other, closely associated crimes, trial court 
struck the statement and instructed the jury to disregard it); 
Humphrey. 793 P.2d at 925 (no error even though trial court gave 
30 
no curative instruction where inappropriate testimony was 
stricken from the record and the jury ordered to disregard it) 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the State respectfully 
requests this Court to affirm defendant's convictions, 
if* 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 5^ day of October, 1991. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
KENNETH A. BRONSTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the foregoing 
Brief of Appellee was mailed, postage prepaid, to Randall 
Gaither, attorney for appellant, 321 South 600 East, Salt Lake 




Rule 30 UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Utile 30. Errors and defects. 
(a) Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect the 
substantial rights of a party shall be disregarded. 
(b) Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and 
errors in the record arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by 
the court at any time and after such notice, if any, as the court may order. 
77-23a-10. Application for order — Authority of order — 
Emergency action — Application — Entry — 
Conditions — Extensions — Recordings — Ad-
missibility or suppression — Appeal by state. 
(3) Each order authorizing or approving the interception of any wire, elec-
tronic, or oral communication shall specify: 
(a) the identity of the person, if known, whose communications are to 
be intercepted; 
(b) except as provided in Subsection (12), the nature and location of the 
communications facilities as to which, or the place where, authority to 
intercept is granted; 
(c) a particular description of the type of communication sought to be 
intercepted, and a statement of the particular offense to which it relates; 
(d) the identity of the agency authorized to intercept the communica-
tions, and of the persons authorizing the application; and 
(e) the period of time during which the interception is authorized, in-
cluding a statement as to whether the interception shall automatically 
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#2 M MIKE OVARD 
#4 M/F 
1 Hello 
2 Hi, vhere's Ross? 
1 Who's this? 
2 This Mike. 
1 Mike who? 
2 Ovard. 
1 Mm K, hold on. Niks Ovard (Background noise child) 
3 Hello. 
2 Whatta ya doln Ross? 
3 Hey, what's up Mike? 
2 What happened to ya yesterday? 
3 Where? 
2 To that, smoke. 
3 Oh, nothln came through. 
2 Oh, really. That's vhat I figured. 
3 Yeah 
2 Yeah. Geez, can ya 
3 They... 
2 Line up an elbov? 
3 Ah, no 
2 No? 
3 Nn not nothin' right off hand. 
2 Oh, really? Why don't you check it out for me and check 
around or whatever. 
3 OK 
2 Ya know. 
3 I can do that. 
2 OK? 
3 OK. 
2 So ah just. I'll probably be home ya knov. 
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CALL MONITORED BY: 
JONES / BESTOR 
SCRIBE: 
FINCH / BOLDA 
*2 M DAN LEMASTER 
#4 M/F 
1 Hello 
2 Hi, Janel. I* Roe* there? 
1 Yeah. Hold on. (Background #1 to 3) R O M . 
(Background TV noiae) 
3 Hello 
2 Hey man. 
3 Hey what'a up Dan? 
2 Hello guy, how ya doin? 
3 Not bad at all? 
2 So'd ya have fun the other night? 
3 Huh? 
2 Did ya have fun the other night? 
3 Urn you know it. 
2 (Laugh) Yeah, it vae kinda fun, huh? 
3 Yeah, it vae really fun. 
2 Yeah you really kicked my ass. Like a wrestlin. 
3 We'd wrestled. <Laugh) 
2 (Laugh) 
3 I got luck. 
2 You got lucky my ass. (Laugh) 
3 (Laugh) 
2 You just threw the moves man, I didn't know moves. 
(Inaudible) (Laugh) 
3 (Laugh) 
2 Your fingers weren't gettin tired, my were. (Laugh) 
3 Yeah, I've been working my guitar fingers. 
2 That, that's right, you've been practicin your guitar more 
lately than I have. (Laugh) 
3 (Laugh) 
2 That's all he contributes to dQin. So what's up man? 
3 Oh nothin, Just gettin ready to go down to the gym. 
2 Alright man. God do you know what I did Sunday? 
3 What's that? 
2 I was supposed to go down to the gym Sunday. I slept all 
day Sunday. 
3 All day? 
2 All day. 
3 Really? 
2 I woke up at seven o'clock. 
3 At night. 
2 Uh-huh. (•) 
3 Oh vow. 
2 (Laugh) 
3 That, that vat a good party than, huh? 
2 Yeah, It vas a good party* I havan't partiad In a long time 
and an <inaudible) 
3 Yeah, me neither. 
2 Stayed up a couple nighta in a row too late doln other thing, 
ya know, to been klnda tired man. 
3 Uh-huh (•) 
2 And a, and a, vae klnda like worn out I gueaa. Ya know 
needed aome aleep. (Laugh) 
3 Yeah. 
2 Heh, the reaaon I called you bud I'm tryln to find Vlllan. 
3 The Vlllan. 
2 The Vlllan 
3 What'd ya need? 
2 Aaa, you know that? 
3 Some white? 
2 Yeah. 
3 Aaaa he really don't have an addreaa. 
2 That'a klnda what (inaudible) Blake Juet aald. I juet, I 
didn't talked to Blake. I talked to hla old lady though. 
3 Yeah. 
2 Um 
3 He klnda like don't have a addreaa, but he'a around 
aomewhere. 
2 Any idea where? 
3 I have no idea. 
2 Mo idea. You, you can, can you help me out (inaudible) by 
any chance? 
3 Wall I probably could, but I it probably vould be from 
Villan. 
2 Oh, OK, ao eome, somebody else though. 
3 Yeah. 
2 I need like a, a, a little half. 
3 A vhat a email one? 
2 Yeah, a little half. 
3 Yeah. 
2 Like you did that night. 
3 Yeah. 
2 OK, urn like how, hov aoon? (Inaudible) 
3 I don't knov. Probably, vhy, vhere you at vork? 
2 I'm at vork. Yeah. 
3 Will vould I be going to your vork or aomethin? 
2 Urn, veil I vaa just gonna cruiae over and pick it up if I 
could find Villan, if I could find him juet cruiae over 
pick 'em up. 
3 Yeah, if you could find Villan you vouldn't even need me. 
2 Yeah, right. But ya knov. 
3 Huh 
2 Do you knov vhere aomethin, ya knov aomethin'a happen. 
3 Z knov vhere aomethin'a happen but. 
2 I could juet meet ya aomeplace in a half hour or aomethin. 
3 I knov but I vaa auppoaed to go to lunch right nov. 
2 Oh, really? 
3 Uh-huh <•) 
2 After lunch? 
3 Yeah. 
2 What tiaa you goin to lunch? You goin to lunch right now, 
alavan? 
3 Yeah, right now, eleven. 
2 And then where can I meet you at what time? 
3 Probably about twelve thirty. Twelve. 
2 Twelve 
3 la that cool? 
2 Where at? 
3 Aaa at ay ahop. 
2 OK 
3 OK 
2 I'll aee ya, how bout, how bout one then? 
3 Alright, it be cooler. 
2 OK cuz Joan'a gonna pick ae up at one. 
3 That'd be better. 
2 Get eomme ahocka on ay truck, atuff like that. So I'll 
drop her off, then I'll be around one, one-thirty, 
eomethin like that. 
3 OK 
2 K bud. 
3 K. Coae alone. 
2 K. Thank you. 
3 Bye 
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CALL MONITORED BY: 
MEYER / MORALES 
SCRIBE: 
K MORALES 
#2 M DAN 
#4 M/F 
1 Hello 
2 Hi Janel, is Rose there? 
1 Yeah* Hold on. It'e Dan. (To backtround) 
3 Hello. 
2 Hey dude. 
3 Hey, what'a up Dan? 
2 Mlseed you man. 
3 Oh yeah. I know. 
2 Went down to the gym and you weren't there. 
3 Oh. 
2 Shall I come to your houee? 
3 Huh? 
2 Shall I come to your houee? 
3 Well, yeah, but I don't think I'm gonna be able to get it. 
2 Okay dokay man. 
3 Oh, tha raaaon vhy la bacauaa thay'ra, I guaas, thay'ra 
watching urn naxt door to our shop. 
2 Oh'a that right? 
3 Yaah, va vant In to confirm It and thay didn't avan tall us 
duda, and wm'rm bummad. Soaaona alaa told ua that thay... 
2 That right? 
3 Yaah, and thay thay vaa Ilka frlanda of Jaffa and va vant In 
thara and thay didn't tall ua. 
2 No kiddin. 
3 Yaah, so lika, fucking punka and than and than my bud Wool 
goaa dovn to tha shop and aaya aoma lady'a ataring at him 
from out of thara. And I go no shit and ha goaa yaah, and I 
go fuck. 
2 That's yaah, yaah, cafa acroaa tha straat. 
3 No, tha VCR placa, yaah tha cafa across tha straat la vhara 
va vant. 
2 Huh. What a fuckin daal man. 
3 No shit. 
2 Oh vail man 
3 So I battar not ba making no movaa yaah (indiacarnabla) 
2 No vay man, no vay Joaa, um that's vhy thay ^9rm looking at 
ma vhan I vas dovn thara. (Laugh) 
3 Yaah. (Laugh) 
2 I can dig it. All right duda. 
3 K bud. 
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SUBJECT NAME — ROSS GALLEGOS 
TARGET PHONE — 801-373-2703 
CASE NUMBER — 8900643 
DATE 04-14-69 
NUMBER DIALED 
TIME OFF HOOK 100521 
TIME ON HOOK 100731 
INCOMING 
ANSWERED? YES 
NUMBER OF RINGS 1 
PHONE BUSY? NO 
#1 M ROSS GALLEGOS 
#3 M/F 
1 Hello? 
2 Hey men 
1 Hey, the phone fell and hung up on ya. 
2 Yeah, that's all right. Are you awake today? 
1 Yeah. 
2 Ya had a good time laat the other night before laat, 
huh? 
1 Yeah. Buddy of mine knocked on ay door about 10 in the 
morning 'n voke me up. 
2 No kiddin? 
1 We did. 
2 Yeah, I knov. 
1 Fun ones. That's what we'll call em. We did fun ones 
until like 8 in the morning. 









CALL MONITORED BY: 
FINCH / NIELSEN 
SCRIBE) 
NIELSEN 
#2 M DAN LEMASTER 
#4 M/F 
2 That'a a (inaudible) 
1 Did ya? 
2 Huh? 
1 Yaah, that's what happened. 
2 That sounds like real fun buddy. 
1 Yeah and then I vent and then I slept. For like goin on 4. 
2 (Laugh) 
1 And vent to work. 
2 Oh, no. You goin straigh (inaudible) vent to vork. 
1 Yeah. 
2 Oh that's like, like a, like normal people. Ya knov. 
1 Like normal people, huh? 
2 Get up and go to vork and (inaudible). You're figuring out 
hov to do this. You party all night. 
1 (Laugh) 
2 (Inaudible) go to vork now. 
1 Yeah, it sucks. 
2 (Inaudible) your vife last night too. Cuz she's right there 
vith ya man. (Laugh) 
1 Where you, at vork? 
2 I'm at work, yeah. 
1 Where's the channel changer? 
2 Huh? 
1 I's lookln for the channel changer. 
2 Oh. Hey bud, you know where a (inaudible) 
1 Huh? 
2 Do you know where we can a get some real quick? 
1 Yeah, I probably do. 
2 Yeah. 
1 But I'm not really to Into goin to get it cuz I don't vanna 
get none. 
2 I'll I'll coin* over and get ya in a little bit. 
1 Huh? 
2 I'll coma over and gat ya if you like. 
1 What? 
2 I'll coma ovtr and gat you in a little vhile later. 
1 Oh no, that's alright I'll go by myself. 
2 Really? Like a, a game? You could (inaudible) 








1 Hov much? 
2 After lunch. 
1 God, let me turn this fuckln TV dovn. What? 
2 After lunch? 
1 Yeah. 
2 (Inaudible) lemme talk. 
1 What time's that "after lunch"? 
2 Urn. I take lunch at like noon. 
1 OK. I gotta run thia tap*, this porno back up to my bud. 
2 Really? 
1 Yeah, up in A. P. 
2 OK. Say like a aayba lika... 
1 Noonlsh sounds cool. 
2 Raally? So I coma ovtr ba about noon? 
1 Yaah. 
2 Noon 30? 
1 Noon 30. 
2 OK. I gotta go pick up soma you knov aonay (inaudibla) 
1 OK bud 
2 OK bud 
1 Bya 
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2 Hi, is Ross home? 




1 He's (inaudible) it's yours. K hold on. 
2 OK <Cough) 
3 Hello 
2 Hello, Ross? 
3 Yeah 
2 Hov are you? Sergio. 
3 Hello, vhat's up Serg? 
2 Not too such* Hov you been? 
3 Not bad. 
2 Hey, I 
3 Yeah 
2 I needed to talk to you. 
3 About what? 
2 A, get some. 
3 Some white? 
2 A, a green paper. 
3 Oh really? 
2 Yeah. 
3 Hmm, urn, veil, you knov where I live don't ya? 
2 No man. 
3 Up around, University er Carterville Road. 
2 Carterville Road? 
3 Yeah. 
2 In the same place? 
3 Uh-huh <•> 






INSTRUCTION NO. // 
The essential elements of the crime charged in count 
II of the Information are as follows: 
1. That the defendant, Ross Gallegos, did distribute, 
agree, consent, offer or arrange to distribute Marijuana, a 
controlled substance. 
2. That the defendant did so intentionally and 
knowingly. 
3. That the acts of the defendant occurred in Utah 
County, State of Utah, on or about March 23, 1989. 
If you believe the evidence establishes each and all of 
the essential elements of the offense as above-stated beyond a 
reasonable doubt, it is your duty to convict the defendant. On 
the other hand, if the evidence has failed to establish one or 
more of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then it is 
your duty to find the defendant not guilty 
